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Wallace: Good evening. This is Mike Wallace. We have an extraordinary interview to air tonight. After considerable effort, I managed to convince Saddam Hussein to give us his own post-mortem on the Iran-Iraq War that ended earlier this year. The story you are about to see is true. I have to forewarn viewers with small children that due to Mr. Saddam's character and the fact that his statements have not been edited, this program may not be appropriate for viewers of all ages.
We turn now to one of the Presidential palaces in Baghdad where I was ushered in, blind-folded, to meet with Mr. Hussein. Since camera crews were not allowed I will describe as best I can our Iran had begun border clashes and they were escalating. By August we began heavy fighting with tanks, artillery duels and air strikes. did not want to give him a chance to resolve the hostage crisis with the Americans. I preferred to meet him on the battlefield while most of the world was still siding against him. So you see, I
had the diplomatic and military edge at this time.
Wallace: But if, as you say, Khomeini was weak, then why was he such a threat to you and your regime? Surely a religious leader with no apparent skills of governance and a population and country recovering from the loss of their leader was no threat to Saddam Hussein? Wallace: But, as I understand it, your failure to knock out the Iranian air force on the first day of the war left your Gulf allies subject to Iran's attack if they continued to harbor your planes. I believe they eventually asked for you to return your planes to Iraq. There was also a request for the US to intervene by Saudi Arabia when it looked like Iran might attack other Gulf oil fields.
In fact, Iran dangerously escalated the war in October 1981 when it attacked Kuwait's oil storage facility because of your use of your allies' airfields. Saddam: These were not defeats! They were militarily insignificant, as pointed out by others.
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I just needed more recruits. And perhaps a slight shift in our tactics. I called together my generals at our "Congress of the Baath." My commanders wisely suggested that we call up college students as well this time in order to build up the Republican Guard. College students might well be enticed to join the Guard due to its mystique, and when well trained they could provide the extra power we needed.
Wallace: But this created a real challenge to your original plan did it not? Calling up more conscripts meant more lives at stake and highly productive ones at that, especially as we understand these men were to be used largely in the infantry. I understood your generals also persuaded you to accept their new battle strategy that left you pretty much an observer. 
Saddam:
Perhaps, but they cleverly knew that if the offensive failed, they could explain, "they were merely straightening out their lines."
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During this period, my Air Force shone and began to shift the balance of power to my advantage.
My renewed airpower changed the tempo and the strategy of the conflict. I used it offensively and extensively from 1986 until the war's end to destroy economic infrastructure, Iranian tankers, and population centers throughout Iran. There was no near term resolution to the conflict on the horizon, and Khomeini had to be stopped. My caution from the early years of the war was gone. Successfully targeting oil refineries, electric grids, sugar factories, concrete plants, and shipping, with the addition of French Mirage and Exocet missiles, we performed brilliantly in these latter years of the war. My most successful operation was when I used 55 Robins, 52. 56 Ibid. 57 Pelletiere and Johnson, 40.
